El contexto actual de las desigualdades sociales en Latinoamérica cuestiona y, al mismo tiempo, desafía el escenario de la educación superior en la búsqueda de procesos de transformación social. Estos desafíos se comprenden, en el marco de esta ponencia, desde la justicia educativa, entendida como la posibilidad de acceso con calidad a la enseñanza-aprendizaje como consecuencia de prácticas individuales y acciones colectivas. A partir de este panorama, y desde una reflexión teórica, se intentan identificar los aportes que ofrece la perspectiva (...) pedagógica y filosófica de la Fundación Universitaria Claretiana en su apuesta de educación superior de frontera, con mirada humanista, liberadora, crítica y contextual, como respuesta a las aspiraciones que tienen aquellas comunidades que afrontan realidades de pobreza, exclusión y violencia sociopolítica, especialmente indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas, de acceder a una universidad que se ajuste a su contexto y dinámicas de vida; no obstante, las exigencias del modelo socioeconómico y del sistema educativo en particular dificultan su materialización. (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa de la primera recepción de la obra de Nicolás Gómez Dávila, que se encuentra en la presentación que de él hizo Hernando Téllez en la revista Mito. El artículo analiza la aparición de las formas argumentativas breves en la revista colombiana Mito y, en particular, el uso que le dieron allí Hernando Téllez y Nicolás Gómez Dávila. En primer término, se discuten las relaciones de ambos autores con formas como el escolio, el aforismo, la (...) entrada de diario y el ensayo. Luego, se examina el uso de formas marginales en la revista Mito por autores como Alfonso Reyes, Jorge Gaitán Durán y Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot. Por último, se analiza la aparición de textos argumentativos de Téllez y Gómez Dávila en la revista para establecer un diálogo entre los dos principales cultivadores de la forma argumentativa breve en la literatura colombiana de los años cincuenta. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses John Danaher’s ‘ethical behaviourism’, a theory on how the moral status of robots should be determined. The basic idea of this theory is that a robot’s moral status is determined decisively on the basis of its observable behaviour. If it behaves sufficiently similar to some entity that has moral status, such as a human or an animal, then we should ascribe the same moral status to the robot as we do to this human or animal. The (...) paper argues against ethical behaviourism by making four main points. First, it is argued that the strongest version of ethical behaviourism understands the theory as relying on inferences to the best explanation when inferring moral status. Second, as a consequence, ethical behaviourism cannot stick with merely looking at the robot’s behaviour, while remaining neutral with regard to the difficult question of which property grounds moral status. Third, not only behavioural evidence ought to play a role in inferring a robot’s moral status, but knowledge of the design process of the robot and of its designer’s intention ought to be taken into account as well. Fourth, knowledge of a robot’s ontology and how that relates to human biology often is epistemically relevant for inferring moral status as well. The paper closes with some concluding observations. (shrink)

Este trabajo cuestiona el supuesto carácter intuitivo o natural del escepticismo acerca del mundo externo. En §1 examinamos una versión del argumento escéptico que se sostiene a partir de dos principios: clausura del conocimiento e indiferencia. Para profundizar la postura que ha defendido Michael Williams, en §2 ofrecemos un examen novedoso de la argumentación escéptica cartesiana que nos permite establecer que en dos argumentos de esta estrategia argumentativa resulta claro que la presunta naturalidad que el escéptico reclama es falsa y (...) que, antes bien, para lograr su conclusión, necesita asumir compromisos con el realismo epistémico, es decir, con la tesis de que nuestras creencias se ubican al interior de una jerarquía epistemológica de acuerdo únicamente con su contenido y en abstracto. Finalmente, basados en argumentos de inspiración wittgensteiniana, en §3 mostramos cómo es que, en contra del realismo epistémico, cada creencia desempeña un papel justificativo según el contexto pertinente. (shrink)

Está escrito que escribe ensayísticamente el que compone experimentando, el que vuelve, interroga, palpa, examina y atraviesa el objeto de su reflexión. Por ser así, la escritura ensayística está presente en novelas, cuentos, poemas y en mayor grado en los ensayos. El parecido de la escritura ensayística con el "pensar" es evidente. Exceptuando al monologo interior –hallazgo de la narrativa– no hay ninguna escritura que se asemeje más al fluir del pensamiento.

This book presents the current feminist critique of science and the philosophy of science in such a way that students of philosophy of science, philosophers, feminist theorists, and scientists will find the material accessible and intellectually rigorous.Contemporary feminist debate, as well as the debate brought on by the radical critics of science, assumes—incorrectly—that certain movements in philosophy of science and science-driven theory are understood in their dynamics as well as in their details. All too often, labels such as “Kuhnian” or (...) “positivistic” are taken for granted, and much of the contemporary postmodern or post-structuralist feminist theory that sets out to criticize science does little to alleviate the reader’s lack of knowledge with regard to such movements.Unlike other texts, Philosophies of Science: Feminist Theories provides a student-oriented framework so that, for example, positivism is given a thorough grounding before the feminist critique of such epistemological theory is given. Other movements discussed include the Kuhnian turn, sociology of science, and the radical critique of science. Feminist theory and critique are interwoven throughout, with one chapter devoted to feminist thought, which includes the work of such thinkers as Longino, Hararway, Hubbard, Nelson, Harding, and Keller. (shrink)

Within Ajzen's Planned Behavior Theory framework, this article tests a model to estimate the predictors of entrepreneurial intention in academic scientists working in Chile. We adapted into Spanish the entrepreneurship intention questionnaire. We tested the entrepreneurship intention model on a sample of 1,027 scientists leading research projects funded by the Chilean Scientific and Technological Development Fund, the country's primary scientific research grant. The results show strong empirical support for the entrepreneurship intention model proposed while highlighting some critical issues specific to (...) entrepreneurial intention in scientists. In particular, we found an indirect effect of perceived subjective social support on entrepreneurial intention, which is mediated by entrepreneurial attitude and perceived behavioral control toward entrepreneurship. These results suggest that policies orientated toward promoting academic entrepreneurship should include developing a healthy social environment toward it, meaning that entrepreneurial intention is not only an individual but an organizational challenge. These policies should analyze the social norms guiding the scientists' reference groups to increase their effectiveness. (shrink)

This study constructs a measurement scale for Socially Responsible Consumption in the particular context of Colombia. It uses a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodological approach, beginning with four focus groups and ending with a quantitative validation exercise employing Exploratory Factor Analysis. The result is a Socially Responsible Consumption measurement scale consisting of four dimensions that reflect paradigms found in the existing literature. These are, however, expressed differently in Colombia. In particular, Socially Responsible Consumption involves consumer behavior that favors corporate social (...) responsibility practices and the rational consumption of resources and products while recognizing the importance of maintaining a healthy lifestyle through healthcare. (shrink)

The development of new effective but expensive medical treatments leads to discussions about whether and how such treatments should be funded in solidarity-based healthcare systems. Solidarity is often seen as an elusive concept; it appears to be used to refer to different sets of concerns, and its interrelations with the concept of justice are not well understood. This paper provides a conceptual analysis of the concept of solidarity as it is used in discussions on the allocation of healthcare resources and (...) the funding of expensive treatments. It contributes to the clarification of the concept of solidarity by identifying in the literature and discussing four uses of the concept: (1) assisting patients in need, (2) upholding the solidarity-based healthcare system, (3) willingness to contribute and (4) promoting equality. It distinguishes normative and descriptive uses of the concept and outlines the overlap and differences between solidarity and justice. Our analysis shows that the various uses of the concept of solidarity point to different, even conflicting, ethical stances on whether and how access to effective, expensive treatments should be provided. We conclude that the concept of solidarity has a role to play in discussions on the accessibility and funding of newly approved medical treatments. It requires, for instance, that healthcare policies promote and maintain both societal willingness to contribute to the care of others and the value of providing care to vulnerable patients through public funding. (shrink)

Kategoriler’de, iki tür ontolojik yüklemleme ilişkisi ve karşılık gelen iki temel varlık ayrımı karşımıza çıkar. Aristoteles, bir taşıyıcı içinde olma ifadesiyle tözleri ilineklerden, bir taşıyıcı için söylenir olma ifadesiyle de tümelleri, özleri bakımından aynı olan tikellerinden ayırır. Anılan ayrımlar bize Aristoteles’in varlık görüşündeki iki temel prensibi verirler: Var olan çok anlamlıdır ve her zaman belirli bir şeydir. Bu bakımdan Kategoriler, şeylerin hem özlerini hem de ilineklerini açıklama ve böylece ilgili yüklemleme problemlerini çözme iddiasına sahiptir. Bu doğrultuda, metnin kendisinde doğrudan bir (...) atıf bulunmasa da literatürde Kategoriler’in Platoncu formlara yönelik iki temel eleştiri getirdiği sonucuna varılır: (1) Formlar teorisi var olanları tek anlamlı varsayarak şeylerin ilineksel özelliklerini açıklamakta başarısız olur; (2) formlar teorisi ilişkisel bir yüklemleme modeli kabul ettiğinden şeylerin özlerini açıklamakta başarısız olur. Bu yazı, Kategoriler ve Platoncu formlar arasındaki bu eleştirel ilişkinin Metafizik’in A kitabında yer alan bir pasajda (990b22-991a3) açıkça görülebileceği iddiasını taşır. Bilhassa Afrodisyaslı Aleksandros’un şerhi ışığında ele alındığında, pasajda formlar teorisine yöneltilen karşıt argümanların kategoriler kuramını varsaydığı ve argümanlar ile tam da literatürde konu edilen iki eleştirinin yapıldığı görülür. Bunun devamı olarak pasajdan, Kategoriler’in kaçındığı fakat formlar teorisinin yüzleşmek zorunda olduğu bazı ontolojik zorlukları çıkarsamak da mümkündür. Bu yazı ile, anılan pasaj bir kanıt olarak sunulmakta ve böylece Kategoriler’de formlar teorisinin örtük bir eleştirisi bulunduğu yönündeki literatür okumalarına katkıda bulunulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunun için önce Aristoteles’in bu metinde ortaya koyduğu yüklemleme kuramı açıklanmakta ve ardından anılan pasaj analiz edilmektedir. (shrink)

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways (...) in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; moral and legal responsibility; and decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars. (shrink)

Let ${\cal I}$ be an ideal on ω. By cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}$ we denote the least size of a family ${\cal B} \subseteq {\cal I}$ such that for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $B \in {\cal B}$ for which $B\mathop \cap \nolimits X$ is infinite. We say that an AD family ${\cal A} \subseteq {\cal I}$ is a MAD family restricted to${\cal I}$ if for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $A \in {\cal A}$ such that $|X\mathop (...) \cap \nolimits A| = \omega$. Let a$\left$ be the least size of an infinite MAD family restricted to ${\cal I}$. We prove that If $max${a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$ then a$\left = {\omega _1}$, and consequently, if ${\cal I}$ is tall and $\le {\omega _2}$ then a$\left = max$ {a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$. We use these results to prove that if c$\le {\omega _2}$ then o$= \overline o$ and that as$= max${a,non$\}$. We also analyze the problem whether it is consistent with the negation of CH that every AD family of size ω1 can be extended to a MAD family of size ω1. (shrink)

Core principles of mereology have been questioned by appealing to time travel scenarios. This paper questions the methodology of employing time travel scenarios to argue against mereology. We show some time travel scenarios are structurally equivalent to more standard ones not involving time travel; and that the three main theories about persistence through time can each solve both the time travel scenario as well as the structurally similar classical scenario. Time travel scenarios that are not similar to more standard arguments (...) are instead problematic because they are open to different, incompatible interpretations. We conclude that compared to the classical arguments against mereological principles, time travel scenarios do not add anything new. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRecent research on moral dynamics shows that an individual's ethical mind-set moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing, whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency. The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that (...) Moral Balancing is not.. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the ethics of automated driving. More specifically, we discuss responsible human-robot coordination within mixed traffic: i.e. traffic involving both automated cars and conventional human-driven cars. We do three main things. First, we explain key differences in robotic and human agency and expectation-forming mechanisms that are likely to give rise to compatibility-problems in mixed traffic, which may lead to crashes and accidents. Second, we identify three possible solution-strategies for achieving better human-robot coordination within mixed traffic. Third, (...) we identify important ethical challenges raised by each of these three possible strategies for achieving optimized human-robot cordination in this domain. Among other things, we argue that we should not just explore ways of making robotic driving more like human driving. Rather, we ought also to take seriously potential ways of making human driving more like robotic driving. Nor should we assume that complete automation is always the ideal to aim for; in some traffic-situations, the best results may be achieved through human-robot collaboration. Ultimately, our main aim in this paper is to argue that the new field of the ethics of automated driving needs take seriously the ethics of mixed traffic and responsible human-robot coordination. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 162-169, February 2022.

En la segunda mitad del siglo XX Nowak denunció que las teorías y las leyes científicas tienen un aspecto idealizado que pasaron de largo los filósofos de la ciencia que consideraron como correcto el modelo nomológico deductivo de la explicación científica. En consecuencia, propuso un modelo alternativo de la explicación científica denominado “explicación por concretización gradual” por Hanzel, quien lo retomó, criticó y enmendó a finales del siglo pasado. Ambos autores reconstruyeron varias leyes y teorías científicas empleando su marco conceptual (...) propuesto ignorando la termodinámica clásica o termostática casi por completo. Por esta razón, se pretende aquí aplicar dicho marco conceptual para reconstruir las leyes de la termodinámica clásica y determinar con precisión en qué consiste su aspecto idealizado, así como las implicaciones de este en la interpretación realista de la termodinámica. (shrink)

This paper discusses the robotization of the workplace, and particularly the question of whether robots can be good colleagues. This might appear to be a strange question at first glance, but it is worth asking for two reasons. Firstly, some people already treat robots they work alongside as if the robots are valuable colleagues. It is worth reflecting on whether such people are making a mistake. Secondly, having good colleagues is widely regarded as a key aspect of what can make (...) work meaningful. In discussing whether robots can be good colleagues, the paper compares that question to the more widely discussed questions of whether robots can be our friends or romantic partners. The paper argues that the ideal of being a good colleague has many different parts, and that on a behavioral level, robots can live up to many of the criteria typically associated with being a good colleague. Moreover, the paper also argues that in comparison with the more demanding ideals of being a good friend or a good romantic partner, it is comparatively easier for a robot to live up to the ideal of being a good colleague. The reason for this is that the “inner lives” of our friends and lovers are more important to us than the inner lives of our colleagues. (shrink)

The deep operation of androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a form of fallacy. On Walton’s account, fallacies are serious mistakes in argumentation that employ presumptions acceptable in other circumstances. There are only isolated cases in which androcentric pre-sumptions are acceptable, and I argue that androcentrism affects an overarching theme of generalization in science rather than an isolated scheme. Androcentrism is related to other ways of treating privileged people as exemplary humans, whose negative impact on processes of argumentation can (...) be described as the fallacy of “appeal to the standard.”. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work has recently received increased attention in philosophy and other disciplines. However, the impact of the increasing robotization of the workplace on meaningful work has received very little attention so far. Doing work that is meaningful leads to higher job satisfaction and increased worker well-being, and some argue for a right to access to meaningful work. In this paper, we therefore address the impact of robotization on meaningful work. We do so by identifying five key aspects (...) of meaningful work: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, self-esteem and recognition, and autonomy. For each aspect, we analyze how the introduction of robots into the workplace may diminish or enhance the meaningfulness of work. We also identify a few ethical issues that emerge from our analysis. We conclude that robotization of the workplace can have both significant negative and positive effects on meaningful work. Our findings about ways in which robotization of the workplace can be a threat or opportunity for meaningful work can serve as the basis for ethical arguments for how to—and how not to—implement robots into workplaces. (shrink)

Even though the link between perceived corporate social responsibility fit and corporate reputation has received much attention from scholars, this tradition has ignored that the underpinnings of this association vary depending on the particular characteristics of each industry under study. To delve into this matter, we investigate in the increasingly relevant context of controversial industries how PCSR-fit could enhance corporate reputation and which are the mediating mechanisms of this association. Our academic contribution is twofold. First, we find that controversial sectors (...) indeed can increase corporate reputation through CSR activities. However, we find that to achieve this goal, the nature of PCSR-fit should be different than what extant literature indicates, because companies in these settings should directly focus on avoiding or reducing their inherent controversial harm or impact. Second, we evidence that “CSR initiatives' legitimacy” and “situational skepticism” mediate the PCSR-fit and corporate reputation relationship in CIs. Therefore, we further unravel the underpinnings of this association to advance what we know on the matter and aid practitioners in this particular context. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that if one is already an advocate of scientific realism, then one would be also a realist about laws of nature. To show this, I argue that only scientific realists would accept that non-accidental regularities require explanation and that their genuine explanation is given by laws of nature. Then, from this conclusion, it seems that scientific realists have reason to believe that there are laws of nature in an objective sense. If this is correct, the (...) conclusion is that there are no reasons for advocates of scientific realism to be skeptics about laws of nature. (shrink)

I argue that the importance of reference for scientific explanation has been overlooked, and that actual referential stability itself is more important in the success of scientific theories than many apparently believe. Citing the work of Van Fraassen and Lipton, I delineate cases of referential failure, both intratheoretically and intertheoretically, and remind us of the role played by reference in theories both realist and non‐realist. I conclude that work on such areas as contrastive explanation cannot move forward without a better (...) account of reference, and cite previously published material on the relationship between reference and epistemic access. (shrink)

The continued predominance of SL‐logic and deductive paradigms in the research on conditional‐based reasoning by experimental psychologists is examined and criticized. After recounting the history and influence of the model, I note the emergence of trends in epistemology and other areas of theory that might provide a springboard for the critique of the model, and I argue that a new approach to examining reasoning with conditionals ought to be developed. I conclude that a superior approach would model such reasoning with (...) sociolinguistic, inductive, and neurophysiological parameters, and that it would not involve any comparison of subjects’ reasoning with the standard deductive rules of logic. (shrink)

When one visits Thailand, one is struck by the enormous number of temples in the urban Bangkok area, many of which are conspicuously absent from the more cherished art historical works on the art and architecture of south-east Asia. The Wat Po complex and Wat Reitmit, one discovers, whatever their virtues for the Western tourist, are not among the temples and archaeological sites mentioned in the text of such an authority as Benjamin Rowland. Nor are these temples—when cited at all—discussed (...) in the same vein as, for example, the Konarak temples of Orissa , where at least some veneration is paid to the plasticity of the carving in its depiction of sexual variety, even if the depictions themselves were at one time held to possess little or no intrinsic merit as pieces of sculpture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, and: Anne Conway: A Woman PhilosopherJane DuranWomen Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, by Jacqueline Broad; 204 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. $65.00. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher, by Sarah Hutton; 280 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. $75.00.Recent work on women philosophers has, in general, approached the topic from two vantage points: on the one hand, a number of anthologies have (...) been published, wherein commentators present a small portion of the woman thinker's work, often without the background necessary for a fuller understanding. On the other hand, some few women philosophers have been the subject of full-length works, but these have tended, by and large, to be women thinkers of the twentieth century, with whose work we are already familiar. Two recent books, one by Jacqueline Broad and the other by Sarah Hutton, go a long way toward improving the situation.Work by Eileen O'Neill, Sarah Hutton and Margaret Atherton, among others, has helped familiarize us with the notion that the seventeenth century—that era so commonly associated with Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy—was also a time of rich theorizing by women philosophers. Jacqueline Broad's book possesses many virtues: it has the finely-tuned style of the careful historian, while at the same time not failing to demonstrate acquaintance with a range of contemporary feminist commentary. Part of the problem in addressing women thinkers of the past is another version of what we are now tempted to call the essentialism problem: does it make sense to think that there is a style that might be demarcated as "feminine," or that might, in some way, pertain uniquely to women theorists? These are difficult issues, but a partial response to the question is to try to remember that it is not for no reason that women thinkers have, indeed, been left out of the canon. As Broad herself says, women philosophers "are now mere footnotes to the standard historical-intellectual accounts of the early modern period" (p. 1).Broad does a superb job of navigating between the need to set out the plain tenets of the thinker's philosophy, and the desire to try to tie it into these larger questions. In six chapters, she addresses the work of Elizabeth of Bohemia, [End Page 200] Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham and Catharine Trotter Cockburn The chapters on Elizabeth, Margaret Cavendish and Mary Astell are particularly strong—here part of the difficulty is that we do have familiar commentaries addressing the work of these women, and it is hard to try to see them in a new light. We are accustomed, for example, to think of Elizabeth merely as Descartes's correspondent. As is the case with information that is currently coming to bear on the question of Harriet Taylor Mill's input into the work of John Stuart Mill, it is difficult for us to see Elizabeth as a thinker in her own right, or, indeed, to give her the credit that Descartes himself gave her; as Broad notes, he had described her as "the only person I have so far found who has completely understood all my previous works" (p. 13). Margaret Cavendish's reputation has suffered from the somewhat scattered approach of her writings, and Broad cites her "reputation for eccentricity" (p. 38). Nevertheless, the sheer volume of her work and its allusion to the problems addressed by the Cambridge Platonists (areas also worked on by Anne Conway) demands that she be taken far more seriously than she has in the past. Astell has become known largely for her more overtly feminist works, such as A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, but she was also the author of several other pieces addressing issues in metaphysics, and again the amount of her work and its citation during her own time would militate against the notion that it should not receive thorough examination.Broad does a wonderful job of setting out the main philosophical questions found in these theorists' works, and she excels at pitting their views against those of the various male philosophers whose work—according to... (shrink)

There are relatively few empirical studies on the impacts of corporate social responsibility policies and programs. This article addresses the research gap by analyzing the incidence of, and the conditions that affect, decoupling among CSR policies, implementation of CSR programs, and CSR impacts for various environmental and social issues. Complete decoupling is a condition of full divergence among policies, programs, and impacts amounting to purely ceremonial CSR. Using ratings from a sustainability rating agency on a sample of about 1,000 large (...) companies in 24 countries, the authors find empirical evidence not supporting a conclusion of complete decoupling. The empirical evidence suggests four levels of nondivergence in the sample. First, for most CSR issues examined, CSR policies of high quality do have relatively strong effects on CSR implementation. Second, CSR programs of high quality do have relatively strong effects on CSR impacts. Third, for most CSR issues, even low-quality CSR policies enforce the incidence and quality of programs in comparison with having no policy at all. Fourth, weak programs have more impact on the realization of CSR goals than having no program at all. The authors also find that the quality of CSR reporting and locating the responsibility for CSR at the board level reduce decoupling by strengthening the quality of CSR programs. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el estudio de las teorías filosóficas sobre las leyes naturales, se ha prestado poca atención a las leyes de la termodinámica. El artículo busca aplicar los marcos conceptuales de tres teorías relevantes, la universalista, la disposicionalista y la contrafactualista, para reformular dichas leyes, y mostrar cómo los marcos conceptuales de las dos primeras no resultan adecuados para tal reformulación, pero sí lo es el de la tercera. Si esta teoría se considera realista, se puede ser realista en este (...) caso. ABSTRACT Little attention has been paid to the laws of thermodynamics in the study of philosophical theories regarding natural laws. The article seeks to apply the conceptual frameworks of three relevant theories, universalism, dispositionalism, and counterfactualism, to reformulate those laws and show that the conceptual frameworks of the first two turn out to be inadequate for that reformulation, while the third one is adequate. If this theory is considered realist, then one can be a realist in this case. (shrink)